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SHOULD THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE APPLY TO
CONSTRAIN APPROPRIATORS, RIPARIANS, AND OTHER
WATER EXTRACTORS?"
A. Demands for existing water supplies are
increasing, requiring difficult choices in
reallocation.
New uses, for urban centers, recreation,
industry, etc., demand a share of existing
supplies.
Historic patterns of water use are changing.
New supplies of water are seldom available,
except at prohibitive costs, e.g., diverting
water from the Columbia River to the Southwest,
or from the Mississippi to the High Plains area
of Texas.
California is facing conflicts that will	 soon
appear in other states.
B. The California Court, in National  Audubon Society 
v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 685 P.
2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413
(1983), (hereinafter referred to as the Audubon case), has
stated the public trust doctrine constrains both past and
future appropriations.
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C.	 This paper will examine the bases for Audstbon,
and will suggest its potential future impact on
western water use.
The paper will also examine the potential impact
of state regulatory power over water
rights by comparing zoning and other police power
regulations.
II. ORIGIN OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
A.	 The doctrine originated from the widespread
practice, from time immemorial, of using navigable
waters as public highways and fishing grounds.
"By the law of nature these things are  sommon to
zmknkind-zthe air, running water, the see and
consequently the shores of the sea."	 The
Institutes of Justinian 2.1.1 (Moyle trans. 5th
ed. 1912).
"Certain interests, such as navigation and
fishing, were sought to be preserved for the
benefit of the public: accordingly, property used
for these purposes was distinguished from general
public property which the sovereign could
routinely grant to private owners. . . [w]hile it
was understood that in certain oroperties--such as
seashore, highways, and running water, 'perpetual
use was dedicated to the public' [Hunter,
Introduction to Roman Law 311 (1921)) it has never
been clear whether the public had an enforceable
right to prevent infringement of these interests."
Sax, "The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,"
68 Mich. L. Rev. 471, 475 (1970). 	 For further
historical references, see Dunning, "The Public
Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law: Discord or
Harmony?" Proceedings of Thirtieth Annual Rocky
3
Mountain Mineral Law Institute, p. 17-1 (1985).
B.	 In the United States the doctrine was announced
early in Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
"By the law of nature. . • the civil law. . . the
common law. . . the navigable rivers in which the
tide ebbs and flows, the ports, the bays, the
coasts of the sea, including both the water and
the land under the water, for the purposes of
passing and repassing, navigation, fishing,
fowlino, sustenance, and all other uses of the 
water and its products. .  . are common to all the
citizens . • . ." [emphasis added)
Later cases supported this view. See Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). 	 Illinois
Central RR v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)
(hereinafter cited as Illinois Central).
III. THE WATERS COVERED BY THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE.
A. In England the doctrine covered waters where the tide
ebbed and flowed.
B. In the U.S. the doctrine was expanded to cover all
waters "navigable in fact". See Carson v. Blazer,
2 Binn.475 (Pa. 1910).
For the historical evolution of the public trust
doctrine, see Sax, supra, Dunning, supra, Selvin,
"The Public Trust Doctrine in American Law and
Economic Policy, 1787-1920, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 1403
(1980). Cohen, "The Constitution, the Public Trust
Doctrine, and the Environment" 1970 Utah L. Rev. 388
(1970); Stevens, "The Public Trust: A Sovereign's
Ancient Preroaative Becomes the Peo p le's Environmental
Right," 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 195 (1980).
In some states the public trust doctrine covers
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additional waters, including those that are navigable
only for pleasure boat use. See Hitchinos v.  Del Rio
Woods Recreation & Park Districts_ 55 Cal. App. 3d 560,
127 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1st Dist. 1976): empolp es  rels_
Baker v. Mack,_ 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rotr 448,
(3d Dist. 1971). See Montana Coalition for Stream
Access. Inc. v. Curran, 682 P. 2d 163 (Mont. 1984), Day
v. Armstrong, 362 P. 2d 137 (Wyo. 1961). 	 See Johnson,
Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake
Levels," 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 233 (1980).
IV. ACTIVITIES PROTECTED BY THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE.
HISTORICALLY THE DOCTRINE WAS USED TO PROTECT NAVIGATION,
COMMERCE AND FISHERIES.
A. But the doctrine evolved at an early date to cover
a broad array of interests. See Selvin, supra,
includino railroad rights of way, highways, streets,
as well as tidelands and the beds of navioable waters.
B. In recent years some courts have ex p licitly included
the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, the
preservation of trust land "in their natural state,
so that they may serve as ecological units for
scientific study as open space, and as environments
which provide food and habitat for birds and marine
life, and which favorably affect the scenery and
climate of the area." Marks v. Whitne y, 6 Cal. 3d 251,
259,491 P. 2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. R ptr. 790, 796 (1971).
See also Audubon, su pra. For a similar listing of
trust protected interests, see Kootenai Environmental_
Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club Inc., 105 Idaho 622
671 P. Ed 1085 (1983), "Trust interests include
property values, 'navigation, fish and wildlife
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habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty and
water quality" (671 . P.2d at 1095), and Shokal v. 
Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 707 P. 2d 441 (1985).
The Washington court in 1987 said the doctrine
covers not only navigation, but also "incidental rights
of fishing, boating, swimming, water skiing, and other
related pur poses generally regarded as corollary to the
right of navigation and the use of public waters."
Caminiti  v. Boyle, 107 Wn. ad. 662, 	 P. 2d. 	
This is consistent with the broad covera ge indicated in
Arnold  v. Mundy, supra (1821).
V.	 STATE POWERS TO CONVEY AWRY PUBLIC TRUST RESOURCES, AND
DESTROY PUBLIC TRUST INTERESTS.
It is usually held that public trust resources can be
conveyed into private ownershi p and the trust
destroyed, but only where the legislation clearly
expresses such purpose, Robbins v. Department of Public
Works,_ 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E. 2d 577 (1969), City of 
Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 26 Cal.
3d 515, 606 P. 2d 362 1 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 1 cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 119 (1980); and see "Audubon".
Some courts allow termination of the trust if the
legislation furthers some other trust purpose.	 See
City of Berkeley, supra.
A.	 The California Court in Audubon, supra, held that the
appropriation code of 1913, under which a permit was
issued to Los Angeles in 1940 to extract water from
tributaries supplying water to Mono Lake, did not
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terminate the public trust interest in this navigable
lake (used primarily as a bird refuge). In fact, the
Cal. Water Board, in issuing the permit, said it had no
choice but to grant the application, in spite of the
harm that would occur to the lake. The Board said:
"It is indeed unfortunate that the City's proposed
development will result in decreasing the aesthetic
advantages of Mono Basin but there is apparently
nothing that this office can do to prevent it. The use
to which the City proposes to put the water under its
applications . . . is defined by the Water Commission
Act as the highest to which the water may be applied. .
• • This office therefore has no alternative but to
dismiss all protests based upon the possible lowering
of the water level of Mono Lake and the effect that the
diversion of water from these streams may have upon the
aesthetic and recreational value of the Basin.
The Audubon Court said "The water rights enjoyed by DWP
(Los Angeles Department of Water and Power) were
granted, the diversion was commenced, and has continued
to the present without any consideration of the impact
on the public trust. An objective study and
reconsideration of the water rights in Mono Lake is
long overdue. The water law of California -- which we
conceive to be an integration including both the
public trust doctrine and the board-administered
appropriative rights system -- permits such a
reconsideration; the values underlying that
integration require it."
The court added that "Once the state has
approved an appropriation, the public trust imposes a
duty of continuing supervision over the taking and use
of the appropriated water. In exercising its sovereign
power to allocate water resources in the public
interest, the state is not confined by past allocation
decisions which may be incorrect in light of current
knowledge or inconsistent with current needs. No
vested rights bar such reconsideration."
Thus it is clear that the California Court did not
consider the 1913 Code, and the permits issued under
that Act, to be sufficiently clear in their intention
to destroy the public trust interest.
It can be argued that the California Court could have
reached the same result (as in Audubon) by using the
"reasonable use" requirement of the 1928 Constitutional
Amendment. But the court chose to rely on the public
trust doctrine.
Audubon was sent back to the trial court for allocation
of the water under the law as announced by the State
Supreme Court. Meantime a secondary issue is being
litigated in the federal courts, i.e., whether the
federal court should proceed with the litigation or it
should be returned to the state courts.	 It may be
several years before any actual allocation occurs.
In Summa Corp. v. Cal. ex Rel State Lands Corn' n, 104
S. Ct. 1751 (1984) the Supreme Court held that 	 the
California public trust doctrine did not apply to
property which originally came from Mexican grants and
where the present owners title have been confirmed in
federal patent proceedings without any mention of the
public trust doctrine, and where, by federal statute,
the validity of the titles were to be decided according
to Mexican law.
B. Prior to Audubon no court decision ever applied the
public trust doctrine to allocate water between the
public under the public trust doctrine, and
appropriators, riparian, or other water extractors.
C. In United Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota State
Water Conservation Commission, 247 N.W. 2d 457 (N.D.
1976), the court prohibited issuance of
appropriation permits until a comprehensive water use
plan was completed which would take account of
navigation, commerce, and fisheries, and explicitly
said the public trust doctrine applied to the
allocation of waters under the aopropriation system in
N. Dak.
VI. SEVERAL REASONS EXIST FOR APPLYING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
TO APPROPRIATORS AND OTHER WATER EXTRACTORS.
A.	 The court in Audubon said the result of a fill
(historically covered by the public trust doctrine) and
water extraction is often identical. Both can destroy
navioation, fisheries, and other public trust
interests.
B.	 Another reason for a p plying the doctrine - not
explicitly addressed by the court - is that all, or
nearly all, extractions of water cause or contribute to
pollution, either by:
1. Reducing the quantity of water and thus its
assimilative capacity; (See Audubon where
the court was concerned that L.A. extractions
would increase the salinity in the lake
enough to kill the brine shrimp, and thus
harm the bird population.)
2. Causing return flows containing natural
salts, selenium, and other chemicals,
leached from the soil, which cumulatively
increase salinity;
3. Causing return flow which carries pesticides,
herbicides, fertilizers, and other polluting
agents.	 See, for example: Aiken, "The
National Water Policy Review and Western
Water Rights Law Reform: An Overview, 59
Neb. L. Rev. 327 (1980).
C.	 Individual extractions, although not necessarily
significant in themselves, produce cumulative loss of
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water quality. Under the Clean Water Act, the Clean
Air Act, and many environmental laws and court
decisions, individual actions that cumulatively cause
pollution are recognized as proper subjects of
regulation. and even prohibition.	 See, Clark "An
Expanded Role for the State in Regional Land Use
Control" 70 Cal. L. Rev. 151 (1982).
1.	 Two examples of cumulative pollution
caused by water withdrawals, combined with
polluted return flow, are:
a. The San Francisco Bay Delta problem. For a
description of this problem, see United
States  v. State Water Resources Control 
Boards182 Cal. Apo. 3d 82,	 Cal. Rptr.
(1986)(hereinafter the Delta Decision). The
salinity problem is discussed at 182 Cal.
App. 3d 143.
b. The Kesterson Wildlife Refuge problem in
central California. Natural selenium is
leached from the soil by irrigation return
flows and is concentrated in the Wildlife
Refuge by drainage canals, killing all fish,
and many birds which live there.
3.	 As this type of problem multiplies, legislatures
and courts will be under pressure to restrict and
regulate water extractions, under either the
public trust doctrine, or state police powers.
As the purposes of the public trust
doctrine include protection of fisheries,
recreational, and environmental values, (some
courts explicitly include water
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quality, See Kootenai Environmental Alliance v. 
Panhandle 'Yacht Club Inc., 671 P. 2d 1085 (1983),
and Audubon), this doctrine might be used to
control cumulative pollution caused by water
extractions under either a ppropriative or riparian
rights.
4. Water pollution caused by extractions may also be
considered an "externality", in economic terms.
The costs of pollution caused by the
extraction by appropriators or riparians have not
historically been included in the cost of the
extractions. The public trust doctrine can
require that these costs be internalized.
5. Such controls might be developed in the form of:
a. Requiring increased efficiency, and more
conservation by holders of existing rights.	 "Th
b. Controlling times of day, week, or month, for
that irrigation would be permitted.
c. Regulating the type and amount of pesticides,
herbicides, and other chemicals that can be
used on land.
d. Restricting the quantity of water extracted
by existing riparians or appropriators in
order to assure adequate water quality. See
Delta case, su pra. See also  Audubon where
the court was concerned about increased
salinity in Mono Lake from L.A. extractions.
VII.	 POLICE POWER REGULATION MIGHT ALSO BE USED TO ACCOMPLISH
SIMILAR RESULTS.
A. Police power regulations might be used to
constrain existing water extraction rights. Such
re p ulations miaht be given added strength by the
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public trust doctrine. The doctrine has sometimes
been used as a basis (or a supplemental basis) for
such legislation.
B. The constitutionality of police power regulations
has often been an issue in ZONING and other land use
regulations.	 Zoning regulations directly impact
"vested" property rights. They are usually upheld
unless they "go too far", Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The Sudreme Court
recently said a land use regulation will only be
struck down if it "does not substantially advance
state interests, ... or denies an owner economically
viable use of his land. Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn
v. DeBenedictist USSC Decided March 9, 1987, Daily
Appellate Report, Wed. March 18, 1987 (hereinafter
Keystone).	 Diminution in value alone is not
sufficient to strike down a zonino ordinance. (See_
Keystone, and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915); for collected cases on this issue see
"Developments in the Law -- Zoning, 91 Harvard L. Rev.
1427 (1978). Ordinances diminishing value from
1,500,000 to $275,000, $450,000 to $50,000, and
$65,000 to $5,000 have been upheld. On the other hand
ordinances reducing value from $48,750 to $11,250, and
from $350,000 to $100,000, have been struck down.
Some courts apply a "balancing test". See Keystone
and Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass.
221, 284 N.E. 2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1108 (1973).	 Comment, "Balancing Private Loss
Against Public Gain to Test for a Violation of Due
Process or a Taking Without Just Compensation, 54
Wash. L. Rev. 315 (1979). And see Delta case 182 Cal.
App. 3d at 147.
For other water cases see Town of Crane Valley v. City
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of Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324;(Ariz. 1981) Appeal
dismissed, 102 S. Ct. 2897, reh'g denied 103 S. Ct.
199 (1982); Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet  Corp.
371 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1979), cert denied 444 U.S. 965;
and People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 30, 605 P. 2d 859 (1980); and Cherry v. Steiner
716 F. 2nd 687 (9th Cir.1983)(upholding Arizona's
Ground Water Law).
The Supreme Court seems to require that
zoning regulations, to be upheld, must allow a
"reasonable return" on one's investment. See Keystone,
and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
For a recent California water case that discusses the
police power, see the Delta case where the California
Court said ". . . a state regulation that merely
restricts a party to the pains reasonably expected from
Ca] contract does not constitute a
substantial impairment. [And is not unconstitutional].
"Nor is every impairment constitutionally proscribed.
Contract rights, like other property rights, may be
altered by the exercise of the state's inherent police
power to safeguard the public welfare. . . . The key
inquiry is whether the importance of the state interest
justifies the impairment." 182 Cal. App. 3d at 147.
1.	 Such controls might, for example, do the
following:
a. Require greater efficiency in water use.
b. Require more conservation (lining ditches)
c. Regulate types of crops grown
d. Regulate methods or times of irrigation
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e. Regulate the amo_unt_ of water to be used.
f. Re p ulate the ty pes of insecticides,
herbicides, etc., that can oe used, and how
they are used.
VIII.	 CONCLUSION
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE - AS APPLIED TO WATER
EXTRACTION RIGHTS - IS NOT THE P DEMIA, AESTHETES, OR
BIRD WATCHERS. RATHER IT HAS VOLVED NATURALLY FROM THE CHANGES
WROUGHT BY POPULATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, LEADING TO CHANGING
PRIORITIES, TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND INCREASED
RECREATIONAL USES OF WATER.
WE CAN ANTICIPATE WIDER APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE IN THE FUTURE AS MORE STATES FACE THE CHALLENGE OF
ALLOCATING SCARCE WATER RESOURCES IN THE FACE OF INCREASING
DEMANDS.
THE WATER POLLUTION PRODUCED BY THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF
WATER EXTRACTORS IS SUBJECT TO EITHER JUDICIAL OR LEGISLATIVE
REGULATION UNDER THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, JUST AS OTHER SOURCES
OF POLLUTION HAVE BEEN REGULATED. NO ONE, NOT EVEN IRRIGATORS,
INDUSTRIES, OR MUNICIPALITIES, HAS A "VESTED RIGHT" 70 POLLUTE
PUBLIC WATERS.
SUCH POLLUTION IS ALSO SUBJECT TO REGULATION UNDER THE STATE
POLICE POWERS.
(
IN 1926 THE SUPREME COURT DECIDED IN VILLAGE OF EUCLID V. 
AMBLER 272 U.S. 365 (1926) TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
ZONING. WITHIN A FEW YEARS ZONING HAD SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE
COUNTRY. I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF WE SOON SEE A SIMILAR
SPREAD OF REGULATION OF WATER EXTRACTION RIGHTS UNDER THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE, AND THE STATE POLICE POWERS.
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